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LEARNING ON THE JOB
John Paul Stevens*
When I was a student at the University of Chicago, I assumed that Robert
Hutchins and Mortimer Adler, who taught the "Great Books" class, were
the wisest and best-educated men on the campus, if not in all of academia.
It was unsettling to learn that they had opposite views on the most
important issue facing the country: whether to provide active assistance to
Britain in its war against Hitler.
When I was a law student at Northwestern, I assumed that the opinions of
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis would contain the correct answers to
questions of constitutional law. It was unsettling to learn that they had
reached different conclusions in the Pennsylvania Coal case that is the
source of our regulatory takings jurisprudence. '
When I became a federal judge in 1970, I thought that the text of the Due
Process Clause defined the limits of its coverage. A literal reading of that
text provides procedural safeguards, but has no substantive conduct.
When a panel on which I sat was confronted with the question whether
the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right of a father who had received
Lamaze training to be present at the birth of his child, I assumed that a
citation to Holmes's dissent in the Lochner case would provide adequate
authority for rejecting the claim.2 It was only after a careful reading of that
dissent that I realized that Justice Holmes's rejection of the constitutional
claim in Lochner rested on a "judgment or intuition more subtle than any
articulate major premise," 3 rather than on the text of the Clause. He
reasoned that
the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can
be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the
statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.4
It was after my belated discovery that Justice Holmes's understanding of
so-called substantive due process was not defined in constitutional text that
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. These remarks were made on
September 30, 2005, at the Symposium on The Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens held at
Fordham University School of Law. The transcript of Justice Stevens's remarks has been
lightly edited.
1. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
2. See Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).
3. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. Id.
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I took note of Justice Brandeis's confession that his comparable opinion had
been formed after he had become a judge. I refer to these two sentences in
his stirring opinion in Whitney v. California:
Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it
is [now] settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.
Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are
protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the states.5
Although Justices Holmes and Brandeis both recognized that the Due
Process Clause contains a substantive component, they did not always agree
on the scope of its protections. For instance, in 1923 Brandeis, unlike
Holmes, joined the Court's opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska,6 setting aside
Meyer's criminal conviction for teaching the German language to a ten-
year-old child. On the other hand, two years later, both Holmes and
Brandeis joined the opinion in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,7 holding that the
liberty of parents to direct the upbringing of their children included the right
to have them educated in parochial schools and military schools.
Holmes's different votes in those similar cases may indicate that he
placed a higher value on parents' right to choose an educational institution
for their children than on the right to study a foreign language, or it may
indicate a change in his understanding of the idea of liberty. Whatever may
have been true of Holmes, I know that I, like most of my colleagues, have
continued to participate in a learning process while serving on the bench.
One of my favorite examples is my experience with a patronage case that
arose out of the designation in 1970 of a Republican secretary of state in
Illinois. The new secretary, a Republican, had allegedly discharged all of
those non-civil-service employees who had been hired by his Democratic
predecessor and who declined to become Republicans. The appeal
presented the legal question whether non-policy-making employees,
including janitors, clerical workers, and license examiners, could be
discharged for refusing to transfer their political allegiance from one party
to another.
When I first looked at the papers, I was happy to have such an easy case
to decide. Like both of my colleagues on the panel, I thought it obvious
that patronage practices, which had long been entrenched in American
history, must be constitutional.
Nevertheless, argument and study of the First Amendment cases cited by
the Court in Perry v. Sindermann8 convinced me that the plaintiffs had
alleged an impermissible basis for their discharge. I concluded my rather
laborious opinion, which neither of my colleagues joined, by observing that
even though "the patronage system is defended in the name of democratic
5. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
6. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
7. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
8. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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tradition, its paternalistic impact on the political process is actually at war
with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First
Amendment."9
The separate concurrence written by Judge Campbell made it perfectly
clear that he also had not expected to appraise the case as he ultimately did.
It is that case that first persuaded me that a judge's pre-argument
predictions should not be admissible in confirmation hearings because they
are inherently unreliable.
The opinions in three later Supreme Court cases, each raising a question
similar to the one that Judge Campbell and I confronted on the Seventh
Circuit, also support that proposition.
In 1976, the Court upheld a similar complaint arising out of the Cook
County Sheriffs patronage practices. 10 Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Four years later,
however, Chief Justice Burger joined a majority of the Court in concluding
that two assistant public defenders were protected from discharge because
of their political beliefs."I More recently, in O'Hare Truck Service v. City
of Northlake,12 Chief Justice Rehnquist joined a majority opinion in which
the Court concluded that an independent contractor had stated a cause of
action by alleging that the mayor of Northlake, Illinois, had removed his
company from a list of firms eligible to perform towing services because he
had refused to contribute to the mayor's electoral campaign.
In each of these cases the decision of the Court was faithful to the law as
it had previously developed. However, I cite them not for that reason, but
because they demonstrate that pre-argument predictions about how a judge
or Justice is likely to vote are far less significant than the knowledge that he
or she will analyze the cases with an open mind and with respect for the law
as it exists at the time of the decision.
The importance of full argument and deliberation has been confirmed
during my time as an Associate Justice in other ways. Perhaps most
striking in this regard are those cases in which summary dispositions, or
proposed summary dispositions, differed dramatically from the ultimate
decision.
In my first Term on the Court, we were presented with an appeal from a
three-judge district court decision upholding the criminal conviction of a
man who had violated Virginia's sodomy statute. Justice Blackmun was a
member of the six-Justice majority that concluded that the appeal did not
even raise a substantial federal question. A few years later, however, with
the benefit of full briefing and argument, he authored an eloquent dissent in
Bowers v. Hardwick,13 which later became law. 14
9. Ill. State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 576 (7th Cir. 1972).
10. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
11. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
12. 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
13. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986).
14. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Equally dramatic is the contrast between the final ruling of the
unanimous Court in Palmore v. Sidoti 15 and the Court's reaction to the case
when it first appeared on the conference list. The case involved a dispute
between divorced Caucasian parents over the custody of their daughter. In
the 1980 divorce decree, custody of the three-year-old child was awarded to
the mother, who later married an African-American. Without any evidence
that the mother had become unfit, the Florida court entered an order
transferring custody to the father in order to protect the child from
anticipated "social stigmatization."' 16
By a vote of 8-1--and I am proud that I was the one--the Court denied
an application to stay the mandate of the Florida court transferring custody.
However, after granting certiorari and hearing argument, we unequivocally
held that the effects of racial prejudice, however real, could not justify the
removal of an infant child from the custody of her natural mother. Of
course, despite the clarity of the Court's opinion, that is exactly what its
earlier refusal to stay the order modifying custody had done.
A few years earlier, the Court had been required to decide the fate of the
snail darter, an endangered species that was threatened with extinction by
the completion of a dam on the Little Tennessee River. 17 I think the case
may have played a role in stimulating Dan Farber's interest in
environmental law.
In May of 1977, when the government sought certiorari from the court of
appeals' order enjoining the operation of the virtually completed project,
Dan wrote me a memo stating that the "arguments made in the petition are
so feeble that it is surprising that the S.G.'s office was willing to take the
appeal."
When the case appeared on the conference list in September, however,
there appeared to be a majority favoring not just a grant of certiorari but a
summary reversal, and the case was relisted for the preparation of a per
curiam opinion. The draft per curiam prompted two dissents, one by Justice
Stewart and one by myself, as well as a concurrence by Justice Powell. The
proposed summary disposition did not carry the day and certiorari was
granted.
After the oral argument, in which Griffin Bell, then Attorney General,
brought a snail darter in a glass jar into the courtroom to dramatize the de
minimis character of the public interest at stake, the Court, by a vote of 6-3,
upheld the injunction. The excellent and thoroughly persuasive opinion for
the Court was authored by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justice
White, both of whom had favored a summary reversal in the fall.
The judicial learning process is ongoing in other areas of the law, such as
affirmative action and the prohibition against taking private property for
public use without just compensation.
15. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
16. Id. at 431 (citation omitted).
17. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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During my early tenure on the Court, I thought it perfectly clear that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination against whites as well as
blacks, even though Congress was principally concerned with
discrimination against minorities. I joined Justice Marshall's opinion for
the Court expressing that understanding of Title VII in the McDonald
case, 18 I explained why Title VI was also colorblind in my opinion in the
Bakke case, 19 and I would have joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent in the
Weber case, 20 in which he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
Title VII permits private employers to adopt voluntary race-conscious
affirmative action plans, had I not been disqualified. I remain convinced
that Justice Rehnquist's thorough analysis of the legislative history of the
statute was entirely correct. The majority in Weber came to a different
conclusion, however, and since Congress has acquiesced in that reading of
the law, we must accept it.
With respect to the constitutionality of affirmative action, we have
learned that justifications based on past sins may be less persuasive than
those predicated on anticipated future benefits.
I remember a conversation with my good friend Lewis Powell a few days
before the argument in the Wygant case,2 1 which presented the question
whether a school board had violated the Equal Protection Clause by
extending preferential protection against layoffs to the few black teachers
on its faculty. As we parted, we agreed that we were happy to have a case
in this area of the law that would be easy to decide. Neither of us realized
why the other thought it easy. Indeed, it was decided in a plurality opinion
by Justice Powell from which I dissented.
In my view, the school board's action permissibly advanced the public
interest in educating children for the future. A comparable interest in the
educational benefits associated with a diverse student body persuaded
Justice O'Connor to uphold the Michigan Law School's affirmative action
policy a few years ago. 22 We've referred to that earlier.
We have learned that there is a critical difference between using race as a
criterion for hiring when the race of the employee is not directly related to
the objectives of the employer-for example, in the construction of
highways-and recognizing its relevance in law enforcement and
educational contexts.
We have yet to appreciate fully, however, the important difference
between a decision to include members of a minority race in a protected
class and a decision to exclude them from preferred treatment. As I wrote
in Wygant, the "inclusionary decision is consistent with the principle that all
men are created equal; the exclusionary decision is at war with that
18. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
19. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 412-21 (1978).
20. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
21. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
22. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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principle." 23 A presumption of validity should attend a decision by the
majority to extend benefits to a disadvantaged class. In its racial
gerrymandering cases, the majority fashioned standards that enabled them
to condemn districting decisions that were designed to include more
minority participation in the political process. 24 Ironically, the Court has
since concluded that such standards are inapplicable to address districting
decisions that disadvantage political minorities.
25
Two cases this Term shed light on the learning process in our takings
law. Justice O'Connor's exceptionally lucid opinion for a unanimous Court
in Lingle v. Chevron2 6 repudiated a dictum that had been treated as a settled
part of our takings jurisprudence for a quarter of a century. She explained
that the statement in Agins v. City of Tiburon2 7 that government regulation
of private property effects a taking if it "does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests" had been derived from due process, rather than
takings precedence, and that it "has no proper place in our takings
jurisprudence." 2 8
Whereas Lingle corrected a past misunderstanding, the second case, Kelo
v. City of New London,29 which upheld an integrated development plan
designed to revitalize a city's economy, adhered to precedent while noting
that different plans may well pose questions for the future.
Though much criticized, the Kelo opinion was surely not an example of
"judicial activism" because it rejected arguments that federal judges should
review the feasibility of redevelopment plans, that they should evaluate the
justification for the taking of each individual parcel rather than the entire
plan, and that they should craft a constitutional distinction between blighted
areas and depressed areas targeted for redevelopment. Indeed, the dissent
criticized the opinion for being unduly deferential to the decisions of state
legislative and administrative bodies.
A second criticism, however, brings me back to the thought that I
expressed at the outset of these remarks. It is the criticism that the opinion
was not faithful to-indeed, that it was "wholly divorced from"--the text of
the Constitution. 30 The relevant constitutional text provides that private
property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." 3 1
As Justice O'Connor explained in her Lingle opinion, that text does not
prohibit any taking of private property, but instead merely places a
condition on the exercise of the takings power. 32 Thus, just as a purely
literal reading of the text of the Due Process Clause would confine its
23. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 316.
24. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
25. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
26. 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
27. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
28. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2087.
29. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
30. Id. at 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. U.S. Const. amend. V.
32. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2080.
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coverage to procedural safeguards and entirely eliminate its substantive
protections, including those that have made provisions of the first ten
Amendments applicable to the states, a purely literal reading of the Takings
Clause would limit its coverage to a guarantee of just compensation.
We have nevertheless assumed that the reference to "public use" does
describe an implicit limit on the power to condemn private property, but
over the years we have frequently and consistently read those words
broadly to refer to a "public purpose." Because one of the opinions
rejecting "use by the public" as the proper interpretation of those words was
authored by Justice Holmes, and because the debate between Holmes and
Brandeis in the Pennsylvania Coal case demonstrates that Brandeis's views
with respect to takings were even more deferential than Holmes's, I am
confident that both of them would have endorsed our holding in Kelo, just
as both of them ultimately endorsed the doctrine of substantive due process.
I suspect that Justices Holmes and Brandeis would also agree that
learning on the job is essential to the process of judging. At the very least, I
know that learning on the bench has been one of the most important and
rewarding aspects of my own experience over the last thirty-five years.
Thank you very much.
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